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INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
NATIONALITY AND REGISTRATION OF
AIRCRAFT - ARTICLE 77 OF THE
CHICAGO CONVENTION
By DR. BIN CHENGI
Nationality of aircraft is a fundamental principle of the Chicago Con-
vention whether aircraft are individually operated or whether they are the
subject of joint or international operation. There is now an accelerating
trend toward joint operation with the status of aircraft thus becoming a
problem of growing importance in international civil aviation. The prob-
lem is not limited in its significance to air law, and the solution adopted
is likely also to influence the future development of the law of the sea,
space law, and the law of international institutions. For this reason, the
Air Law Committee of the International Law Association included in its
work program the subject of nationality and registration of aircraft with
special reference to Article 77 of the Chicago Convention. Early in 1966
the Rapporteur, Professor John Cobb Cooper, distributed to the Com-
mittee a preliminary memorandum outlining the general problems which
he felt should be included in the subject matter and asking for comments
of the members. The following are what he considered the basic questions:
(a) Does the Council of ICAO have the power to authorize interna-
tional registration of aircraft, waiving the necessity for the registration
of such aircraft by an individual member State?
(b) If so, are such aircraft entitled to the rights and privileges ac-
corded under the Chicago Convention to aircraft which have been
registered with a particular State and have thus acquired the nation-
ality of such State?
Dr. Bin Cheng, Chairman of the Committee, submitted the following
memorandum. It subsequently became Annex C to Professor Cooper's
Report which was adopted by the Air Law Committee at its meeting of
22 June 1966 for submission to the Fifty-Second Conference of the Inter-
national Law Association at Helsinki in August, 1966. Dr. Cheng's memo-
randum is of great importance presenting certain new, original, and valu-
able suggestions, and the Journal wishes to acknowledge its thanks to the
author and to the International Law Association for permission to repro-
duce it.
t Reader in International Law in the University of London; Chairman of the Air Law Corn-
mittee of the International Law Association; Ph.D. (London), Licencii-en-droit (Geneva).
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I. JOINT AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DISTINGUISHED
1. The Chicago Convention in its Chapter XVI (i.e., Articles 77-79),
which is derived from Article X of the Canadian draft,1 obviously per-
mits' and, where appropriate, even encourages* ICAO members to form
pools, joint organizations, or international agencies to operate air services.
For the purpose of the Convention, "'air service' means any scheduled air
service performed by aircraft for the public transport of passengers, mail
or cargo.'"
2. Article 77 of the Convention draws a clear distinction between
"joint operating organizations" and "international operating agencies,"
and its last sentence refers only to "international operating agencies."
On the other hand, Article 79 mentions only "joint operating organiza-
tions," but not "international operating agencies." While the Convention
probably sees no great difference between the words "organization" and
"agency," it attributes two clearly different meanings to the adjectives
"joint" and "international."
3. Joint operating organizations are those established by States through
their Governments or their airlines, which may be State-owned or
privately-owned," for the purpose of operating air services. Inasmuch as
they may be formed even of privately-owned airlines, they are not of a
type that would be endowed with international legal personality. Examples
include Tasman Empire Airways, British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines,
Ltd., Central African Airways Corporation, East African Airways Cor-
poration, S.A.S., and probably also Air Afrique.°
4. International operating agencies are also organizations established to
operate air services, but they and, where appropriate, their parent organi-
zations are international in character, being the result of treaties between
States and are endowed by their participating States with international
legal personality, as well as legal capacity in their municipal legal systems.
They fall into two types which are treated differently by the Chicago
Convention, if account is taken of the preparatory work of the Con-
vention.
Type I consists of those established by public international organizations,
the right of which to engage in international air navigation under the
terms of the Convention is recognized by ICAO.' They are not those re-
ferred to in the first sentence of Article 77, but they do come under the
last sentence of Article 77.
Type II consists of those coming under the first, as well as the last,
sentence of Article 77. They are inter-governmental agencies established
1 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION CONFERENCE (Chicago Conference
of 1944) 570, 581 (1949) (hereinafter Chicago Conference).
a Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), 7 Dec. 1944, art. 77, 61
Star. 1180, T.I.A.S. 1591 (effective 4 April 1947) (hereinafter cited as Chicago Convention).
a Chicago Convention, art. 78.
4 Chicago Convention, art. 96a.
'Chicago Convention, art. 79.
6 See CHENG, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 252 (1962).7 See paras. 5-11 infra, 41-45 infra.
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by member States of ICAO jure imperii. Those established by member
States through their Governments jure gestionis or through their designated
airlines fall within the category of joint operating organizations contem-
plated in Article 79 which is not applicable to international operating
agencies. A possible illustration of Type II international operating agencies
would be the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation
(EUROCONTROL), with its air traffic services Agency, if EURO-
CONTROL had been established to operate air services, and not to con-
trol air traffic."
5. Provision for the establishment of Type I international operating
agencies (they would hardly have come under the category of joint organi-
zations) by ICAO, upon request received from the United Nations Se-
curity Council, was made in Article IX (3) of the Canadian draft.' Under
Article II (5) of the draft, these operating agencies had the right to carry
international traffic to and from ICAO member States. This proposal
apparently did not receive support and was not repeated in the subse-
quent tripartite draft presented by Canada, the United Kingdom, and
the United States."°
II. POWER OF THE ICAO COUNCIL UNDER ARTICLE 77
6. In the Canadian draft, there was no provision that aircraft of ICAO
operating agencies should be registered in individual member States or
that such agencies should be "subject to all the provisions of" the Con-
vention. On the other hand, the last sentence of Article 77 would have
been applicable to such aircraft, with the result that the ICAO Council
would have had a free hand in determining in what manner the provisions
of the Convention relating to nationality of aircraft should apply to such
aircraft or aircraft operated by other Type I international operating agen-
cies and entitled to engage in international air navigation under the terms
of the Chicago Convention.
7. Since, however, ICAO is not now competent to establish such oper-
ating agencies without an amendment of the Convention, and there are
no other Type I international operating agencies with the right to engage
in international air navigation under the terms of the Chicago Conven-
tion, this power of the ICAO Council under the last sentence of Article
77, in so far as Type I international operating agencies are concerned, is
at present inoperative, but probably not extinct. It may be of interest to
observe that a Canadian representative to the ICAO Council expressed
a very similar view many years after the Chicago Conference.1
8. On the other hand, according to the first sentence of Article 77,
Type II international operating agencies, as well as pooled services and
s See International Convention Relating to Co-operation for the Safety of Air Navigation
(Eurocontrol Convention) signed at Brussels 13 Dec. 1960. CMND. No. 2114 (1963), reprinted in
2 Shawcross & Beaumont 198 (3d ed. 1966).
I Chicago Conference 570.
"Id. at 418.
SICAO COUNCIL MINUTEs 41st Sess., 3rd meeting (1960), ICAO Doc. No. 8106-3, C/927-3,
para. 19 (1960).
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joint operating organizations, "shall be subject to all the provisions of this
Convention."
9. Consequently, aircraft operated in pooled services or by joint or-
ganizations and Type II international operating agencies have to conform,
inter alia, to Articles 17-21 of the Convention in order to engage in inter-
national air navigation under the teris of the Convention.1"
10. The last sentence of Article 77 is not applicable to either pooled
services or joint organizations."
11. In the light of paragraphs 8 and 9, the power of the ICAO
Council under the last sentence of Article 77, in respect of Type II inter-
national operating agencies in contradistinction to Type I international
operating agencies, ' is limited merely to determining in what manner the
provisions of the Convention relating to nationality, without having to
be modified-at least in substance-shall be applied to aircraft operated
by such agencies,"' for instance, by specifying a solution similar to that
incorporated in Article 18 of the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offenses
on Board Aircraft."
III. STRUCTURE OF OPERATING ORGANIZATION NOT TO BE EQUATED
WITH REGISTRATION
12. The problem which has caused difficulty and controversy is not,
strictly speaking, that of operating air services by "aircraft operated by
international operating agencies" or, for that matter, by aircraft operated
by joint organizations or in pooled services, because services operated in
pool, by joint organizations, and by international agencies, can all make
use of aircraft which are individually registered each in a contracting
State and no problem will then arise in applying the provisions of the
Convention relating to nationality to such aircraft.
13. For the same reason, it would not be correct simply to equate the
problem of joint operating organizations with that of dual or multiple
nationality resulting from joint registration of aircraft by two or more
States," or the problem of international operating agencies with what may
be called "internationality" or "institutionality" of aircraft resulting
from international registration of aircraft by an international institution
possessing international legal personality.'
14. By "internationality" or "institutionality" of aircraft is meant the
same relationship between an aircraft and an international institution
possessing international personality as that between an aircraft and its
national State. While it is recognized that this relationship, outside the
context of the Chicago Convention, might be acquired through ownership
12 See para. 19 infra.
13 See para. 2 supra.
14 See para. 6 supra.
15 See paras. 20-22 infra.
1aICAO Doc. No. 8364 (1963).
17 See paras. 25-34 infra.
1"See paras. 35-45 infra.
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or perhaps even operational control, as well as registration, for the sake of
convenience, the question of the possibility for international organizations
to confer their internationality on their aircraft is subsumed under that
of international registration.
15. Both the 1960 ICAO Panel of Experts and the 1965 Report of
the Subcommittee on Article 77 of the ICAO Legal Committee have
rightly perceived that the main problem involved in operation of air
services by joint or international operating organizations under the terms
of the Chicago Convention is one relating to the general question of
registration and nationality of aircraft under the Convention. The prin-
cipal provisions are Articles 17-21. Several other articles are, however,
also relevant. Both bodies whose contributions to the elucidation of the
subject under discussion have been invaluable have, however, each in its
own way, ignored one or another of the distinctions which it is felt
ought to be made, such as those between joint organizations and interna-
tional operating agencies,"9 between joint registration and international
registration, ° between the structure of the organization and the nationality
of the aircraft it operates."'
IV. THE OVERRIDING CHARACTER OF ARTICLES 17-21
16. Articles i7-21 are derived via Article 19 of the United States
draft" and Articles XVI-XIX of the Canadian draft" from Chapter II
of the 1919 Paris Convention."
17. The reference to the Paris Convention is intended to draw attention
inter alia to the relevance of the history of the Paris Convention for the
interpretation of the Chicago Convention.
18. The reference to the Canadian draft is intended to draw attention
inter alia to the unavoidable inference that, in the opinion of the Canadian
Government which also proposed that ICAO should be empowered to
establish operating organizations with aircraft presumably not registered
in any member State,"5 internationality of aircraft was not only practicable
but also not incompatible with the fundamental fabric of the Chicago
Convention, even though the provisions of the Convention relating to
nationality would have to be suitably adapted by the ICAO Council be-
fore they could apply to such ICAO aircraft. In particular, the Canadian
Government must have considered coexistence between internationality
of aircraft and Articles 17-21 possible.
19. A further inference is that, in the opinion of the Canadian Govern-
ment, which made the proposal," services operated in pool, joint, organi-
zations, and Type II international operating agencies, which were per-
19 Cf. para. 28 infra.
"Cf. ,paras. 30, 35 infra.
21Cf. paras. 28, 31 infra.
2' I Chicago Conference 554.
23Id. at 570.
24 2 Chicago Conference 1348.
23 See paras. 5, 6 supra.
" See para. 1 supra.
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mitted subject to compliance with "all the provisions of the Convention,"'
would be able to operate within the terms of Articles 17-21."
20. It must have intended, consequently, to limit the power of the
ICAO Council under the last sentence of Article 77 in relation to Type
II international operating agencies merely to determining how they can
operate their aircraft within the provisions of the Chicago Convention,
including Articles 17-21, without modification."
21. It follows that, save in the case of aircraft owned and operated by
Type I international operating agencies the right of which to engage in
international air navigation under the terms of the Chicago Convention
ICAO members may at some future date recognize,' the permissibility
under the Chicago Convention of no registration, dual registration, mul-
tiple registration, joint registration, and international registration of air-
craft has to be examined primarily by reference to Articles 17-21, without
assistance from the last sentence of Article 77.
22. A further reason why this interpretation appears correct is that,
if any of the above types of registration are not permissible under Articles
17-21, it would be difficult to understand why it should be made permis-
sible, through the last sentence of Article 77, solely for aircraft operated
by Type II international agencies engaged in scheduled air services."1 If,
for instance, dual registration is made possible for aircraft operated by
Type II international operating agencies, why should it be denied to
private aircraft or aircraft engaged in commercial non-scheduled flights,
in pooled services, in scheduled services operated by the ordinary airlines
or by joint operating organizations? Articles 17-21 must consequently be
considered overriding in character. What is said below regarding registra-
tion is thus true of all aircraft intending to engage in international navi-
gation under the terms of the Chicago Convention, with the exception of
those operated by Type I international operating agencies."
V. REGISTRATION AND DUAL REGISTRATION
23. First of all, it seems clear that every aircraft, in order to engage in
international air navigation under the terms of the Convention must be
registered, even though the Convention may not be entirely specific on
the subject. Witness, for instance, the importance attached to registration
in Article 21, and see also Articles 20 and 29." The purpose is to ensure
that every aircraft is provided with an individual identity. Every mem-
ber State is entitled to make its own rules concerning registration or trans-
fer of registration of aircraft."
24. Dual or multiple registration of an aircraft "in more than one
27 See para. 8 supra.
'a See para. 9 supra.
2 See para. II supra.
30 See para. 6 supra.
31 See paras. 1, 2, 10 supra.
2 See para. 6 supra.
" See also para. 32 infra.
"Chicago Convention, art. 19.
[Vol. 32
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
State" is, however, forbidden by Article 18 of the Convention. Dual or
multiple registration means the registration of an aircraft by its owner
or operator in more than one State with the result that the aircraft has
more than one nationality. Unless there is coordination between the States
concerned, both negative and positive conflicts of jurisdiction will almost
inevitably follow which, as well as other undesirable consequences, might
easily open the door to abuse."
VI. JOINT REGISTPATION
25. The position is different in the case of joint registration where two
or more States maintain a joint register. Aircraft borne on such a register
would also have dual or multiple nationality, but in this case the States
maintaining the joint register would doubtless have taken measures in
order to remove possible conflicts of jurisdiction. A joint nationality mark
would probably also be selected. From this point of view, it is to be
doubted whether the majority of the 1960 Panel was correct in saying
that aircraft entered in a joint register would have "no nationality,""
unless, in its opinion, Article 18 prohibited joint registration and conse-
quently rendered it void. But this would be begging the question; for the
question is whether Article 18 permits joint registration. Furthermore, it
is more than doubtful:
(i) whether Article 18 really prohibits joint registration;
(ii) whether, even if it does, it can have the effect of depriving the
aircraft entered in a joint register of all its nationalities; and
(iii) whether, assuming for argument's sake that it can, it will deprive
the aircraft of all its nationalities, including its active nationality.
Even Article 6 of the 19 5 8 Geneva High Seas Convention does not pur-
port to have such far-reaching effects. Its paragraph 2 merely Permits con-
tracting States to "assimilate" a ship sailing under two or more flags to a
"ship without nationality" in the event of the ship "using them according
to convenience."
26. In fact, joint registration does not contravene at least the wording
of Article 18; for presumably such a register will either be kept in one of
the participating States or a part of it will be maintained in each of the
participating States, and actual registration in one State will be deemed
sufficient. It is not impossible to interpret Article 18 as prohibiting only
actual and uncoordinated, but not joint and merely constructive, registra-
tion in more than one State. Moreover, if two or more ICAO members
which exercise condominium over a territory establish a joint register and
confer their nationalities on aircraft entered in the joint register, will they
be contravening Article 18? It is to be doubted.
27. Furthermore, it does not appear that joint registration is incom-
asCf. Convention on the High Seas (Geneva High Seas Convention), 29 April 1958, art. 6,
[1962] 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2312, 15, T.I.S. 5200.
"Report of Panel of Experts to the ICAO Council, PE-77/Report, para. 13 (1960).
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patible with either the letter or the spirit of the remaining provisions of
the Chicago Convention. The status of such joint registering States as
parties to the Convention is in no way affected. In so far as their rights
and obligations in relation to aircraft of their registration are concerned,
what is involved in most cases is merely to interpret the words "State of
registration" as meaning also "States of registration" and this can hardly
be regarded as contrary to the accepted rules of interpretation. An aircraft
with joint registration is to be considered an aircraft registered in ICAO
member States and entitled to the privileges conferred by the Convention
on such an aircraft only if all the joint registering States are ICAO mem-
bers. As regards the obligations of the joint registering States under the
Convention in respect of such an aircraft, each of the registering States is
a registering State of the aircraft for the purpose of the Convention. The
problem becomes one which is far from being unknown to general inter-
national law. If a State assumes certain treaty obligations in respect of its
nationals, it is no less bound by these obligations in cases where its na-
tionals have dual or multiple nationality.
28. In this regard, the objection of the majority of the 1960 Panel does
not appear to be either convincing or even pertinent. In its view:
only aircraft having the nationality of contracting States are entitled to
the privileges of the Chicago Convention since by the terms of that treaty
such privileges are given only to States as distinguished from international
organizations.'
But on the assumption that these aircraft, even if they have a joint nation-
ality mark, have the nationalities of all the registering States," the privi-
leges they enjoy would merely be the privileges of their registering States. 9
No "international organization" is involved. The fact that the aircraft
may be operated by either joint operating organizations or international
operating agencies is in reality irrelevant; for aircraft with joint registra-
tion may well be operated also by individuals or airlines that have only
one nationality. In this regard, the majority view of the Panel erroneously
equates joint registration with joint or perhaps international operating
organizations," and, if valid, would lead to the rejection of the possibility
of joint or international operating organizations. This would be contrary
to the express provisions of Articles 77-79"1 and what is already daily
occurrence; for both joint operating organizations and public interna-
tional institutions are today perfectly able to operate within the terms of
the Chicago Convention by using aircraft registered in individual ICAO
member States. Rights of commercial entry and exit are separate issues.
29. Indeed, the preparatory work of Articles 77-79 of the Convention,
which are derived from Article X of the Canadian draft,"' seems to indi-
37 Ibid.
31 See para. 2 5 supra.
39 See para. 27 supra.
4 See paras. 12-15 supra.




cate that the permissibility of joint registration was taken for granted,
bearing in mind that Chapter II of the Paris Convention was in substance
also to be found in the Canadian draft.43 Thus paragraph 11 of the Sum-
mary of the Canadian draft stated:
Two or more member States may decide that the best way of operating all
or some of the air services between them is not by rival companies each carry-
ing a national flag but by a joint organization. The member States are not
prevented from establishing such joint operating organization ..
The notion of a joint flag seemed implicit. Moreover, it may be observed
that the last sentence of Article 77 mentions only "international operating
agencies" and not "joint organizations," ' assuming thus, it would appear,
that "joint organizations" carrying a "joint flag" (presumably on their
aircraft) would raise no special problem requiring intervention by the
Council.
30. To this extent, it seems that, adopting the basic idea in Professor
Kelsen's view on interpretation4 ' that, except for purposes of authorita-
tive or authentic interpretation, most legal rules are in truth polysemous,""
the interpretation that "the provisions of the Chicago Convention-with-
out it being necessary to amend them-is not an obstacle to the principle
of joint registration" ' is certainly not an impossible one. The same is,
however, not necessarily true of international registration," as was ap-
parently assumed by the 1965 Resolution of the Legal Subcommittee
which used the rather ambivalent expression "joint international registra-
tion."
31. But, if joint registration were deemed permissible under the exist-
ing Chicago Convention, it seems highly desirable, from the practical
point of view, that the last sentence of Article 7 7 " should be so re-
interpreted and stretched beyond its present wording as to allow the
ICAO Council to attach certain conditions to "aircraft with joint regis-
tration" instead of simply determining "in what manner the provision of
this Convention shall apply to aircraft operated by international operating
agencies." Paragraph (2) of the 1965 Resolution of the Legal Subcom-
mittee appears to assume that this re-interpretation of the last sentence
of Article 77 is possible, but in reality a substantial de facto amendment
of this provision would be involved. If such an amendment were accepted,
whether de facto or de jure, the Council might wish to incorporate inter
alia the substance of the two eminently reasonable provisos contained in
the 1965 Resolution of the Subcommittee. It might also wish to require, as
a prerequisite to the establishment of a joint register, that the participating
4a See paras. 16-22 supra.
" 1 Chicago Conference 570.
4 See paras. 2, 10 supra.
46 See Preface On Interpretation to KELSEN, LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS at xiii (1950).
47 Cf. Cheng, The First Twenty Years of the International Court of Justice, 20 YEARBOOK OF
WORLD AFFAMS.241 (1966).
48 Cf. Resolution of the 1965 Session of the ICAO Legal Subcommittee, para. 1.49See paras. 35-45 infra.
5°See paras. 6-11 supra.
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States establish joint aeronautical authorities similar to the East African
Common Services Organization or the Central African Higher Authority
for Civil Air Transport and take such other steps as may be necessary in
order to obviate potential conflicts of jurisdiction between the partici-
pating States and to prevent possible abuses on the part of the operators.
The existence of joint or common aeronautical authorities will, from the
standpoint of the other contracting States, facilitate the application of
such provisions of the Convention as, for instance, Article 26 on investi-
gation of accidents.
32. The main objection against joint registration is, however, to be
found in the history of Articles 17-21, which, as has already been pointed
out, are derived from Chapter II of the 1919 Paris Convention.51 In this
regard, the learned Rapporteur has rightly drawn attention to what the
Aeronautical Comn-ission of the 1919 Peace Conference regarded as the
basic principles to be incorporated into the Convention: "Reconnaissance
du principe que tout aronef doit possder la nationalit6 d'un Etat con-
tractant et que tout a~ronef doit 8tre inscrit sur les registres de l'Etat dont
il possde la nationalit6."5 This principle was originally proposed by the
United States, but it found expression also in Article 3 (v) of the British
Draft Convention: "Nationality shall not be conferred upon an aircraft
by more than one of the contracting States."'
Military considerations appear to have lain behind the prohibition of
dual nationality and of registration by a contracting State of aircraft
which were not wholly owned by its own nationals.' The subsequent
amendment of Article VII in 1929 allowing every contracting State to
make its own rules governing registration removed much of the ratio
legis prohibiting dual nationality. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that
what was originally intended to be a provision prohibiting dual nationality
has been retained in Article 18 of the Chicago Convention.
33. The more explicit evidence of the original intention of the con-
tracting parties to prohibit dual nationality, the desirability of certain
conditions being attached to the establishment of joint registration, and
the need of a substantial de facto amendment of the last sentence of
Article 77 of the Convention in order to achieve this objective combine
to tilt the balance in favor of the view that a de jure amendment of the
Chicago Convention is needed in order to permit joint registration.
34. In view of the general compatibility of joint registration with the
basic fabric of the Chicago Convention, and the practical need felt by
many States for such joint registration, it is suggested that ICAO should
give urgent consideration to such an amendment. In this connection, it
may be observed that it is certainly desirable that international organiza-
tions should, in principle, avoid de facto amendments of their constitu-
5' See paras. 16-17 supra.
" 2 Chicago Conference 1384. See also ROPER, LA CONVENTION INTERNATIONALE DU 13 OCTO-
BRE 1919 PORTANT REGLEMENTATION DE LA NAVIGATION AERIENNE 42 (1930).
'3ROPER, op. cit. supra note 52, at 257, 274 (art. I of the French draft).
" Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation (Paris Convention), 13 Oct.
1919, art. XVII, II L.N.T.S. 173, 192-93, No. 297. See also ROPER, op. cit. supra note 52, at 133-37.
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tion and conscious deviations from the Rule of Law for the sake of ad
hoc expediency."
VII. INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION
35. It is suggested that ICAO should at the same time consider the
possibility of amending the Convention in order to permit also "inter-
national registration" which, with due respect to the Legal Subcommittee,
is an entirely different problem from joint registration.'
36. "International registration," or perhaps more accurately, inter-
nationality of aircraft' implies the right of an institution possessing inter-
national personality to claim and exercise quasi-territorial jurisdiction over
aircraft 8 independently of any State. The institution concerned confers
its internationality on the aircraft in much the same way as the State of
registration confers its nationality on aircraft entered in its register of
aircraft. The problem has already been much discussed in relation to
ships.
37. The right of an international institution to bestow its internation-
ality on ships and aircraft (not only through registration, but also
through ownership or possibly even operational control) depends entirely
on the extent of its own international legal personality which, in turn,
depends, first of all, on its own constitution as established by its members
and ultimately on recognition by other subjects of international law.
38. In so far as members of an international institution are concerned,
there is no reason why they may not confer such competence on the
institution they intend to establish or have established. Having done so,
they will be bound to recognize such internationality. Non-members which
have recognized the full extent of the international legal personality of
such an institution may also have to recognize the logical consequences of
their own action. Other non-members, however, which have not recog-
nized the international legal personality of the institution remain free
whether or not to recognize such internationality, notwithstanding the
doctrine of "objective international personality" propounded by the In-
ternational Court of Justice in the Reparation for Injuries suffered in the
Service of the United Nations Advisory Opinion (1949)."
39. It may well be that, before States decide to confer such powers on
an international institution which they intend to establish, or of which
they are members, before an international institution to which such powers
have been granted proceeds to exercise them, or before third States recog-
nize the internationality of such an institution over its aircraft, they will
all wish to be assured that at least powers exist also for the institution
" Cf. Cheng, International Law in the United Nations, 8 YEARBOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS 170
(1954).
58 Cf. para. 30 supra.
57 See para. 14 supra.
" Cf. Cheng, The Extra-Terrestrial Application of International Law, 18 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBLEMS 132, 134-42 (1965).
" Cf. Cheng, International Law in the United Nations, 8 YEARBOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS 191
(1954).
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concerned effectively to discharge the functions and duties normally in-
cumbent on the national State of an aircraft." If an international institu-
tion claims quasi-territorial jurisdiction over aircraft, it should be in a
position to exercise it. But ultimately this is a matter which is the concern
of the institution and the other subject or subjects of international law
in question.
40. That, on a consensual basis, there is nothing to prevent aircraft of
an international institution from enjoying all the rights and privileges of
aircraft with a nationality and perhaps even more seems to have been the
opinion of CINA which at its 13th Session in 1927, in answer to a re-
quest from the League of Nations, advised that: "[T]he best procedure
for ensuring to aircraft of the League of Nations the possibility of flying
freely, even at times of emergency, over the territory of States parties to
the Convention of October 13, 1919, consists in inserting provisions to the
effect in the said Convention." ' Reference may also be made to the New
Zealand and Australian proposal, put forward at the Chicago Conference,
1944, to internationalize international air transport,"' to Articles 11 (5) and
IX(3) of the Canadian draft," and to Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva High
Seas Convention.
41. In many ways, the question now being discussed is the extent, if
any, to which members of ICAO are under a duty to recognize the inter-
nationality of aircraft. The answer appears to be in the negative.
42. Had the proposal of the Canadian draft that ICAO should be em-
powered to establish, upon request received from the Security Council,
operating organizations to operate international air services been accepted,"
ICAO members would doubtless have been bound to recognize the ICAO
internationality of the aircraft of such operating agencies, should ICAO
decide not to register them in any contracting State. Under the last sen-
tence of Article 77, the ICAO Council would then determine in what
manner the provisions of the Convention relating to nationality of air-
craft would apply to them. The ICAO Council could decide to establish
an ICAO register or to institute some other system of identification of
ICAO aircraft. Such a determination would be binding on ICAO mem-
ber States. But, the Canadian proposal not having been adopted, neither
ICAO nor ICAO members are bound to recognize the internationality
of aircraft of any international institution.!
43. Even, for argument's sake, were it admitted that under the last
sentence of Article 77 the ICAO Council would be able through a deter-
mination to render the internationality of aircraft of either a Type I
international operating agency (or its parent body) or a Type II inter-
"See problems raised in Francois, Report on The Right of International Organizations to Sail
Vessels under their Flags, 2 I.L.C. YEARBOOK 102 (1956). Cf. Mankiewicz, Aironefs internation-
aux, ANNUAIRE FRANCOIS D DRoiT INTERNATIONAL 685 (1962).
41 Cf. Jennings, International Civil Aviation and the Law, 22 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 191, 206-08
(1945).
" 1 Chicago Conference 539.
6 See paras. 5-11 supra.
" Ibid.
3 See para. 7 supra.
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national operating agency (or, where appropriate, its parent organiza-
tion)" binding on ICAO member States, all the objections raised by the
majority of the 1960 Panel of Experts against "international registration ' 67
would still be decisive. The essence of these objections consists in the fact
that, inasmuch as such international institutions or operating agencies
possess independent international legal personality, they constitute inde-
pendent international persons who cannot, even through an ICAO Council
determination, benefit from the provisions of the Chicago Convention
without being parties thereto. They would be aircraft of non-parties to
the Convention. Herein lies the fundamental difference between joint
registration and international registration, and between a joint operating
organization and an international operating agency.
44. But, here again, the objections are not against internationality of
aircraft, as such, which is neither legally impossible nor, it would appear,
fundamentally incompatible with the basic provisions of the Chicago Con-
vention.
45. While Type II international operating agencies (see para. 4 supra)
should, in principle, conform to the ordinary provisions of the Chicago
Convention and resort to joint registration of their aircraft, once this has
been formally made possible, instead of international registration, inter-
national registration might be justifiable in special circumstances. On the
other hand, in the case of public international organizations, many of
which, especially the United Nations, have already felt for some time the
need to operate their own aircraft, individual or joint national registration
of their aircraft may often be impractical, inappropriate, or inexpedient.
The question has not been sufficiently explored by all concerned why
the constitution of ICAO should not be so amended in order to permit
international registration and the admission into membership of suitable
international institutions satisfying certain minimum requirements, so that
aircraft of such institutions which are not "used in military, customs and
police services" ' will be able to operate under the terms of the Chicago
Convention, bearing the internationality mark of their registering insti-
tution. Indeed such a step would seem to be highly in conformity with the
aims and objectives of the Convention as stated in its Article 44, the first
and foremost of which is "to ensure the safe and orderly growth of inter-
national civil aviation throughout the world." From this point of view,
the decision of the International Communications Conference at Atlantic
City in 1947 to accept the Secretariat of the United Nations as a "special
member" of ITU with all the rights and obligations of a full member,
except the right to vote,", serves as a useful precedent."0 It is a precedent
that should be commended to the serious consideration of ICAO and other
interested international organizations.
66 See paras. 4-11 susra.
67 Report of Panel of Experts to the ICAO Council, PE-77/Report, para. 12 (1960).
6" Chicago Convention, art. 3.
69International Communications Conference, ITU Doc. No. A/1492 at 5 (1947).7 Cf. DETTER, LAW MAKING BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 145 (1965).
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THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON AERIAL
COLLISIONS: SOME TEXTUAL CRITICISMS
By T. J. KELLIHERt
I. INTRODUCTION
While the Montreal Draft1 constitutes a significant improvement on the
Paris Draft,' it is fortunate that the ICAO Legal Committee decided that
the new draft should not be regarded as a definitive one for submission
to a diplomatic conference. There are a number of features of the Mon-
treal Draft which on the face of it appear unusual or unsatisfactory and
which require further examination by the ICAO Legal Committee and
its Subcommittee on Aerial Collisions. The purpose of this short article
is to make certain textual criticisms of the Montreal Draft,' some of these
criticisms relating to matters of substance and others to points of drafting.
II. INTERCHANGE OF AIRCRAFT
As with the Rome Convention of 1952 on Damage Caused by Foreign
Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface (see Article 23), the geographical
scope of the Montreal Draft is based on the place of registration of the
aircraft (see Article 1). This criterion does not appear to provide for the
situation where an operator based in a Contracting State charters an air-
craft from an operator based in a non-Contracting State. Set out below
t LL.B., Victoria University of Wellington; Barrister and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of
New Zealand; Regulatory Officer, Department of Civil Aviation, New Zealand; Tutor in the Law
of Air Transport, New Zealand Technical Correspondence Institute, Department of Education.
'Draft Convention on Aerial Collisions, ICAO Doc. No. 8444-LC/151, reprinted in 30 J.
AIR L. & COM. 385 (1964).
a ICAO LC/SC/Aerial Collisions WD. No. 71. For commentary of the draft prepared by the
ICAO Secretariat, see ICAO LC/SC/Aerial Collisions WD. No. 72.
a For other literature on the proposed Convention, see CITEJA Draft Convention on Aerial
Collisions and American Section Proposals, reprinted in 5 J. AIR L. 478 (1934); CITEJA Draft
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are certain examples of possible situations which illustrate how anomalies
can arise under the Montreal Draft. For the purposes of these examples,
it is assumed that Australia and New Zealand become Contracting States
whilst Malaysia and Canada either do not or delay becoming so.
Example I
Collision occurs over New Zealand. One aircraft is operated by Qantas
and is registered in Australia. The other aircraft is operated by CPAL
and is registered in Canada. The Draft Convention applies.
Example 2
Collision occurs over New Zealand. One aircraft is operated by Qantas
on charter from Malaysian Airways and is registered in Malaysia. The
other aircraft is operated by CPAL and is registered in Canada. The
Draft Convention does not apply.
Example 3
Collision occurs over the high seas. One aircraft is operated by Air New
Zealand and is registered in New Zealand. The other aircraft is operated
by Qantas and is registered in Australia. The Draft Convention applies.
Example 4
Collision occurs over the high seas. One aircraft is operated by Air New
Zealand and is registered in New Zealand. The other aircraft is operated
by Qantas on charter from Malaysian Airways and is registered in
Malaysia. The Draft Convention does not apply.
The failure of the Montreal Draft to accommodate the case of inter-
change of aircraft could be rectified by the inclusion of an additional
Article worded along the following lines: "If an operator who is ordi-
narily resident or has his principal place of business in a Contracting
State uses an aircraft belonging to another operator and registered in a
non-Contracting State, such aircraft shall, for the purposes of this Con-
vention, be deemed to be registered in the Contracting State using such
aircraft."
There is a precedent in the Montreal Draft itself for departing, in
special circumstances, from the criterion of the place of registration.
Article 21, which did not occur in the Paris draft, makes special provision
for aircraft operated by a multinational airline where the aircraft is not
registered in any particular State. Such aircraft are, for the purposes of
the Convention, deemed to be registered in each of the States involved,
except that if the collision or interference occurs over the territory of any
one such State the aircraft is deemed to be registered in that State only.
III. CARRIAGE OF AIRMAIL
On the face of it, the words "property carried under an agreement for
carriage" used in Article 5 (1) (b) and "any other property on board the
aircraft if such property is carried under an agreement for carriage" used
in Article 10 (1) (e) of the Montreal Draft are broad enough to include
airmail. Air New Zealand, for example, has a contract with the New Zea-
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land General Post Office so that airmail carried by Air New Zealand on
behalf of the Post Office appears to be "property carried under an agree-
ment for carriage" for the purposes of the Draft Convention.
The author does not know whether the apparent inclusion of airmail
is intentional or the result of an oversight. Whichever be the case, there
are compelling reasons for excluding airmail from the ambit of the Draft
Convention. Readers will note that the Warsaw Convention of 1929 does
not apply to carriage performed under the terms of any international
postal convention (see Article 2(2)), and the Hague Protocol of 1955
does not apply to the carriage of mails and postal packages (see Article
2 (2)). The exclusion of airmail from the Warsaw-Hague system and its
inclusion in the aerial collisions regime could lead to some odd situations.
A postal administration, or the sender, or their cessionaries, could bring an
action in tort against the air carrier and the damages would not be limited
by any international agreement." But in the rare case where the loss
should be caused by an aerial collision, the damages recoverable from the
carrier at fault would be limited by Article 10 (1) (e) to 250 gold francs
per kilogram (approximately £ 2-2-6 or $5.95 per lb.).
Such an anomaly could lead to injustice in recourse actions. The New
Zealand General Post Office has limited its liability for insured items of
other administration origin to £ 400 (approximately $1,120) being "the
sum adopted in its internal service" as permitted by the Final Protocol
to the Vienna Agreement of 1964 concerning Insured Letters and Boxes.
Thus, where loss of insured mails is caused by an aerial collision, a sum up
to £ 400 per item could be recovered from the New Zealand General Post
Office, but in a recourse action against the carrier at fault the Post Office
could recover only £ 2-2-6 per lb.
In the circumstances, the author feels that airmail must be excluded
from the scope of the Draft Convention, and that this should be achieved
either by the inclusion of an appropriate definition of the term "property"
or by the inclusion of a new Article corresponding to Article 2 (2) of
the Hague Protocol.
IV. ACCUMULATION OF DAMAGES
Article 13 (2) of the Draft Convention is designed to prevent a claim-
ant from accumulating damages in excess of the limitation by the device
of suing more than one operator or suing both an operator and his serv-
ants and agents. "A claimant may not recover more than the maximum
amounts specified with respect to death or injury caused to each passenger
or damage caused to the property concerned . . . regardless of whether
the claim is brought against one or more of the operators or owners of
the aircraft involved in the collision or interference or their servants or
agents. '
'See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. South African Fire & Acc. Ins. Co., 3 So.Afr.L.R. 150
(1965).
' Report of the Legal Committee on the Draft Convention on Aerial Collisions, ICAO Doc. No.
8444-LC/I 51, Anniex C.
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Notwithstanding the intent of Article 13 (2), it is arguable that the
wording adopted, when read together with Article 19, permits aggrega-
tion of damages by the simple expedient of proceeding against more than
one operator under different Conventions. Article 13(2) states in part
that "a claimant may not recover more than the maximum amounts
specified in paragraph 1 of Article 10 in the cases therein referred to."
However, the cases referred to in Article 10 specify the limits of the
liability of the operator of an aircraft in relation to damage caused to
another aircraft or to persons or property on board that other aircraft.
The cases referred to in Article 10 do not specify the limits of the opera-
tor's liability to persons or property on board his own aircraft. Moreover,
Article 19 contains a savings clause with respect to the Warsaw Conven-
tion, whether or not as amended by the Hague Protocol or supplemented
by the Guadalajara Convention of 1961. Thus there appears to be nothing
in the Montreal Draft to prevent a claimant from recovering in excess of
the limitation by proceeding against one operator under the proposed
Aerial Collisions Convention and by proceeding separately against the
other operator under the Warsaw Convention.
The author believes that the accumulation of damages in this manner
is contrary to the spirit of the Draft Convention and that the Montreal
Draft should be amended to prevent the possibility of any such aggrega-
tion. It is suggested that Article 19 (which is unnecessary and serves no
useful purpose) be deleted entirely and that Article 13 (2) be redrafted
along the following lines:
The aggregate of the amounts recoverable from the operators and the owners
of the aircraft and from their servants and agents acting within the scope
of their employment who are subject to liability under this Convention or
any other international convention or any other legal rules shall not exceed
the limits specified in paragraph 1 of Article 10 except as provided in Article
11 or as otherwise provided in such other international convention.
The reference to "any other legal rules" is necessary because neither the
Hague Protocol nor the Draft Aerial Collisions Convention create a cause
of action against servants or agents but merely limit their liability under
other legal rules.
V. MISCELLANEOUS
The Report of the Legal Committee's Fifteenth Session states that the
definition of the expression "in flight" is applicable also to aircraft cap-
able of vertical flight (see paragraph 9).' On the wording of Article 1 (2),
this appears to be so only in the uncommon situation where such an
aircraft makes a conventional landing, i.e., a landing run. To make it
perfectly clear that vertical landings are included, the first part of Article
1 (2) could perhaps be reworded as follows:
An aircraft is deemed to be in flight from the moment when power is applied
for the purpose of take-off until, in the case of an aircraft which makes a
" Ibid.
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landing run, the moment when the landing run ends and, in the case of an
aircraft which makes a vertical landing, the moment when the landing
touch-down ends.
Possibly the last phrase might be better reworded as "the moment when it
has alighted on the surface."
The wording of Article 7 seems rather obscure. The author is uncer-
tain whether the expression "any other legal rules" is intended to refer
solely to rules created by other international conventions, or whether it
is intended also to include national laws. Similarly, the author is uncer-
tain whether the expression "damage other than damage contemplated in
Article 4" is intended to refer to damage contemplated in Article 5, or
whether it is intended also to refer to damage outside of the scope of the
Draft Convention for which liability arises under "any other legal rules."
The expression "proved to have been at fault" seems inappropriate, as
proof of fault is not required under various legal rules to which, pre-
sumably, the expression "any other legal rules" refers. Proof of fault is
not required under Article 5 of the Draft Convention nor under the
Warsaw-Hague system as fault is presumed; and proof of fault is not
required under the Rome Convention as liability is absolute.
In Article 10 it is not clear whether the expression "value" refers (a)
to the book or balance sheet value (i.e., cost price less annual provision
for obsolescence) or (b) to the market value (i.e., re-sale value) or
(c) to the insured value (which, in practice, may correspond to the book
value or to the market value or to the replacement value or a sum ap-
proximating either value). If it refers to the book value, injustice will
result where the market value is greatly in excess of the value shown in
the operator's balance sheet, as is often the case. If it refers to the market
value, how can this be assessed for aircraft for which there is no market
value, for example certain military aircraft or aircraft which are proto-
types? If it refers to the insured value, what is the position where, owing
to the limited market value of an aircraft, it is not covered by insurance?
An important feature of the Draft Convention is that where damage
is caused to persons not carried under an agreement for carriage (e.g.,
crew), the liability of the offending operator is unlimited for death, in-
jury, or delay caused to such a person. But where destruction, loss, dam-
age, delay, or loss of use is caused to the property of such a person (e.g.,
the crew's personal effects), the liability of the offending operator is
limited to the values specified in Article 10(1) (a) and (b). This con-
clusion seems to follow from the expression in Article 10(1) (a) "or to
any property thereon other than property specified in Article 5." It is
anomalous that the offending operator's liability in respect to death, in-
jury, or delay caused to the crew of the other aircraft is unlimited whereas
his liability in respect to destruction, loss, damage, delay, or loss of use
of the property of the crew of the other aircraft is limited, bearing in




In Article 9 the fault of the operator's servants and agents acting within
the course of their employment, whether or not within the scope of their
authority, is attributed to the operator. In Article 12 the servants and
agents are also made personally liable when acting within the course of
their employment upon proof of fault. The words "whether or not within
the scope of his authority" which appear in the former Article should
surely also appear in the latter?
VI. SOME LANGUAGE DIFFICULTIES
The words "servants or agents" used in Article 5 (2) of the Draft
Convention introduce an element of ambiguity by suggesting that serv-
ants and agents constitute two separate classes. If a case were to arise be-
fore a court in an English-language country, the operator might succeed
in rebutting the presumption of liability by proving that his agents took
all necessary measures, notwithstanding that his servants did not. This
would seem to follow from the word "or" which normally suggests alter-
natives. The words "for him or them" could be construed in the same way.
To discover the derivation of this wording it seems that one must re-
fer to the legislative history of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague
Protocol. As the Warsaw Convention was drafted in French only, there
is no authentic English text with international validity. Difficulty arose
in finding the precise English equivalent of the French term "pr~poses."
Looking at the translation scheduled to the United Kingdom Carriage by
Air Act of 1932, it can be seen that this term was first translated simply as
"agents." However, later an "explanation" was inserted by Section 54
of the Civil Aviation Act 1949 to declare that "references to agents . ..
includes references to servants."
The phrase "servants or agents" made its first appearance in the auth-
entic English text of the Hague Protocol. At the Hague Conference, un-
like the Warsaw Conference, the drafting had to be done in three languages
and the Drafting Committee was conscious of the difficulty. The Secre-
tariat looked into the meaning of the term "pr~pos's" and in consequence
the Drafting Committee came to the conclusion that it included both
servants and agents. In most places in the English text, the servants and
agents have been linked by "and" or "or" according to whichever is
appropriate to the context. Generally, where there is a negative (e.g., A
servant or agent shall not. ... )"or" has been used, but this was not in-
tended as an alternative "or" conveying a choice.
As between parties to the Hague Protocol, the Warsaw Convention and
the Protocol are to be read and interpreted as a single instrument (see
Article XIX). It thus became necessary for English-language countries to
check their translations of the text of the Warsaw Convention in order
to ensure the adoption of uniform terminology throughout the amended
Convention. In the United Kingdom, the words "servants or agents" were
substituted for the word "agent" in Article 20 of the new English text
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scheduled to the Carriage by Air Act of 1961. Likewise, in New Zealand a
similar substitution was made in the English text scheduled to the Carri-
age by Air Act of 1962. The author believes that the new wording adopted
in both countries is ambiguous and open to misinterpretation. Fortunately,
the potential dangers have been removed by the scheme adopted in both
the United Kingdom and New Zealand statutes. Each scheduled both
English and French texts, and each provided expressly that if there were
any inconsistency the text in French should prevail.
Article 5 (2) of the Draft Convention uses the exact words of the
English text of Article 20 of the amended Warsaw Convention. Presum-
ably the French texts of the two Conventions will also be made to corre-
spond exactly. In short, the words "servants or agents" will presumably
be rendered in French as "pr~poses" and the words "for him or them" as
"leur." In that case it should hardly matter which text was the more
authoritative, should a case be referred to any international tribunal.
After examining the legislative history, it would be clear to any interna-
tional tribunal that the draftsmen were relying on the Warsaw-Hague
precedent, which equates the word "pr~poses" with the words "servants
or agents." But would a domestic court in an English-language country
arrive at the same conclusion? And should a domestic court be required
to examine the legislative history, not only of this Convention but of the
Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol as well, to arrive at a mean-
ing contrary to the ordinary and natural meaning of the words? Presum-
ably, too, the final clauses, as in the Chicago Convention, will provide
that each text should be of equal authenticity, and consequently there
will be no prevailing French text for the English-language courts to re-
fer to in order to resolve the ambiguity.
It has been suggested to the author that the ambiguous expressions in
Article 5 (2) be replaced with the words "he and those who are his serv-
ants or agents" and "for him and those who are his servants or agents."
The introduction of the relative shows that servants and agents are a
single class; the retention of the word "or" shows that one does not have to
be both a servant and an agent to qualify as a member of the class.
However, the author believes that this wording is unnecessarily cumber-
some and recommends that the words "servants and agents" and "for
him and them" be substituted for the words "servants or agents" and
"for him or them."
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